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Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 55 (Dec. 6, 2012)
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COMMON 
LAW REDUNDANCY THEORY 
 
Summary 
 
Appeals from district court judgments of conviction based on similar questions 
regarding double jeopardy and redundancy. The Court considered whether a criminal 
defendant who is charged with both attempted murder and battery or aggravated battery 
through a single act can be so charged, or whether such a charge constitutes double 
jeopardy, or violates Nevada’s common law redundancy theory.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The State is allowed to charge a criminal defendant with battery, assault and 
attempted murder as a result of one single act, because battery, assault, and attempted 
murder each include elements the others do not.  Furthermore, a prosecutor can request 
cumulative punishment for those crimes.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
The opinion used two distinct criminal cases to answer this question.  
 
 The first case was Jackson v. State, in which the defendant/appellant Jackson, in 
the course of attempting to rob a bar, forced the bartender to stay in the restroom, shot the 
bartender in the leg, and attempted to shoot him in the chest. The bartender struggled and 
Jackson eventually ran away, failing to rob the bar or kill the bartender as he intended. 
Jackson was charged with attempted murder, assault and battery, all with a deadly 
weapon, as well as robbery, kidnapping, burglary and discharge of a firearm in a 
building.  
 
 The police used a video that was recovered from the bar’s surveillance system as 
evidence of Jackson’s actions.  The video was a “composite” video, which omitted 
recordings from the night of the incident that did not show the defendant or the bartender. 
  
 Jackson was convicted for all charges. The district court sentenced Jackson to 
multiple consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and specific terms of years on the 
attempted murder, robbery, and kidnapping counts, with consecutive additional terms for 
the weapon enhancements, and lesser concurrent sentences for his assault, battery, and 
other convictions. Jackson and appealed his convictions for assault and battery on top of 
the attempted murder conviction on the basis that a conviction for all three of these things 
violated his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and were impermissibly 
redundant. Jackson also argued that the State’s failure to preserve the complete 
surveillance video violated his due process rights. 
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 The second case was Garcia v. State, in which the defendant/appellant Garcia and 
his friends got into a street fight with three other men. Garcia drew a gun in the course of 
the fight, and shot at the three men. One of the men died and the other two men were 
injured. Garcia was convicted of murder and two counts of attempted murder with a 
deadly weapon, as well as battery with use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily 
harm to one of the men and battery with use of a deadly weapon against the third man 
who was harmed the least. He was given a life sentence with the possibility of parole for 
the murder conviction, consecutive sentences of 192 months for the two attempted 
murder convictions, and two lesser concurrent sentences for the aggravated battery 
convictions.  
 
 Garcia appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated battery on 
the basis that the convictions for both violated double jeopardy and were impermissibly 
redundant. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Pickering wrote the opinion for the Court sitting en banc. 
 
 The Court used the two cases as a basis to make the determination of whether in 
Nevada, and in compliance with the U.S. Constitution, conduct that violated more than 
one criminal statute can produce multiple convictions in a single trial. The Court 
determined that this question is one of “statutory construction with a constitutional 
overlay,” and therefore reviewed this question de novo.2  
 
 The right against Double Jeopardy in criminal convictions comes from the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and is extended to Nevada citizens the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
3
 and is also guaranteed to 
Nevada citizens through the Nevada Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause in both 
the United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution protect against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  
 
 “Where two statutory provisions proscribe the same offense,” a defendant cannot 
be charged under both of those statutes and be given two punishments for the same 
offense.
4
 Given this presumption, the Court then stated that it must determine whether the 
statute describing battery and attempted murder are the same offense, and therefore 
whether a defendant cannot be punished under both statutes.  
 
Nevada utilizes the Blockburger test to determine whether two statutory 
provisions involve the same offense.  The Blockburger test  “inquires whether each 
offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offense’ 
                                                        
2 Firestone v. State, 120 Nev. 13, 16, 83 P.3d 279, 281 (2004). 
3 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
4 Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996). 
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and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.”5The Court 
clarified that the Blockburger test does not determine, by itself, whether multiple 
punishments are permissible, but instead determines whether statutes violated “penalize 
the same or several distinct offenses,” and if they do punish the same offense, whether 
the presumption restricting cumulative punishment applies.   
 
 The Court used this principle in analyzing whether Jackson and Garcia were 
punished in violation of Double Jeopardy principles. In so analyzing, the Court looked to 
the actual language of Nevada’s attempt statute Jackson and Garcia were convicted 
under, which states in relevant part, “an act done with the intent to commit a crime, and 
tending but failing to accomplish it, is an attempt to commit that crime.”7 The statute also 
states, “nothing in this section protects a person who, in an unsuccessful attempt to 
commit one crime, does commit another and different one, from the punishment 
prescribed for the crime actually committed.”8 So, reading the statute outside of any 
constitutional context, the statute itself allows for conviction and punishment of crimes 
that arise from the same act for which a defendant is charged under the attempt statute.   
 
Double Jeopardy 
 
 Using the principles of Rutledge, the Court looked to the statutory text to 
determine the legislative intent, and through the above-mentioned statute, determined that 
the legislature authorized cumulative punishment. The Court noted the language of the 
attempt statute which says, “nothing in this section protects a person who, in an 
unsuccessful attempt to commit one crime, does commit another and different one, from 
the punishment prescribed for the crime actually committed.”9 Using this analysis, the 
Court determinedthe legislature authorized cumulative punishment because in the statute, 
the legislature expressly authorized punishment for both attempted murder (the 
“unsuccessful attempt to commit one crime”) and assault and/or battery (“the crime[s] 
actually committed”).  
 
 The Court’s analysis does not end there, however, because the appellants 
specifically argued that the case be analyzed under Blockburger. The Court rejected this 
challenge, stating that convictions of both attempted murder and battery with a deadly 
weapon did not violate Double Jeopardy because “each offense contain[ed] an element 
not contained in the other.” Attempted murder requires intent to kill, malice aforethought, 
and failure to complete the crime of murder, and none of those are requirements of 
battery or assault.
10
 Therefore, the Court stated that the two statutes do not proscribe the 
same offense, according to the Blockburger test. 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.330 (2007). 
8 Id. 
9 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.330(2). 
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.330 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010 (2007), 
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Nevada’s Redundancy Doctrine 
 
 Jackson and Garcia also challenged their convictions based upon Nevada’s 
redundancy doctrine. Jackson and Garcia argued that because their multiple convictions 
are factually based on the same act or course of conduct, the convictions cannot stand, 
even if each crime contains an element the other does not. In other words, appellants 
asserted that Nevada’s redundancy doctrine uses a “same conduct” standard, which was 
overruled through Barton.
11
 In Barton, the Court rejected the “same conduct” approach 
and instead adopted the “same elements” approach that was endorsed in  Dixon v. United 
States.
12
 Based on Barton, the Court rejected this argument.  
   
 The Court then discussed two cases Jackson and Garcia relied heavily on in their 
redundancy arguments: Salazar v. State
13
 and Skiba v. State.
14
 Both Salazar and Skiba 
were decided with the “same conduct” approach for determining the permissibility of 
cumulative punishment, which is inconsistent with Barton. The Court stated that, 
consistent with Barton, it disapproved of Salazar, Skiba, and their redundancy progeny to 
the extent that they endorse a fact-based “same conduct” test for determining the 
permissibility of cumulative punishment.  The Court stated that the proper focus is on 
legislative authorization, beginning with an analysis of the statutory text.  If the 
legislature has authorized cumulative punishment, that legislative directive controls.  If 
there has been no express legislative authorization, then the Blockburger test is 
employed.  
 
 The Court found that Jackson’s and Garcia’s cumulative punishment challenges 
failed under Blockburger and Barton. Further, the Court stated that in disapproving of 
Salazar and Skiba, the holding is limited to the fact-based “same conduct” approach of 
determining redundancy. The Court also stated that Nevada’s redundancy case law has 
captured “unit of persecution” and alternative-offense challenges, which this opinion 
does not question.  
  
Jackson’s Due Process Argument 
 
 Finally, Jackson argues that the district court erroneously admitted video 
surveillance evidence despite the State’s violation of Leonard v. State, which stated that a 
defendant’s due process rights may be violated if the State fails to preserve evidence and 
the defendant can show that the State acted in bad faith or that the defendant suffered 
undue prejudice.
15
 The Court found that the defendant’s reliance on Leonard was 
misplaced because the state could not have failed to preserve or destroy evidence that it 
did not have in the first place. 
 
                                                        
11 117 Nev. 686, 693 (2001), 30 P.3d 1103, 1107 (2001). 
12 Barton, 117 Nev. at 694-95, 30 P.3d at 1103. 
13 119 Nev. 224, (2003). 
14 114 Nev, 612 (1998). 
15 117 Nev. 53, 68, 17 P.3d 397, 407 (2001). 
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 In investigating Jackson’s crime, the police collected the complied security 
footage and did not collect the omitted portions of the video. Because Daniels v. State
16
 
stated that “police officers generally have no duty to collect all potential evidence from a 
crime scene,” failing to collect the omitted portions of the video, alone, did not constitute 
a due process violation. However, because the Court states this rule is not absolute, it 
used the Leonard two-part test to determine whether the State’s failure to gather evidence 
in this case caused injustice to Jackson. This two-part test requires that the Court consider 
whether the uncollected evidence is material, and if it is material, whether the failure to 
gather evidence was the result of negligence or bad faith.  
 
 The Court determined that the omitted video evidence was not material because 
had the omitted video footage been available to the defense, the result of the proceedings 
would not have been different. Even if the Court could find a way to determine the 
evidence was material, Jackson failed to prove that the State acted with bad faith, and 
therefore the State’s action in omitting some of the video surveillance as evidence does 
not violate the holding in Leonard v. State.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court affirmed the convictions of Jackson and Garcia. 
                                                        
16 114 Nev. 261, 956 P.2d 111 (1998). 
